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In the past decade much has been learned about the way in which school
vouchers aﬀect low-income families and their children. Ten years ago, the
empirical information available about this widely debated question came
primarily from a ﬂawed public school choice intervention attempted in
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sprouted across the country in such cities as Milwaukee, Cleveland, Indi-
anapolis, and San Antonio. Initially, the evaluations of these innovations
were limited by the quality of the data or the research procedures employed.
Often, planning for the evaluation began after the experiment was under
way, which made it impossible to gather baseline data or to ensure the for-
mation of an appropriate control group. As a result, the quality of the data
collected was not as high as researchers normally would prefer.1
Despite their limitations, these early evaluations provided program oper-
ators and evaluation teams with opportunities to learn the problems and
pitfalls accompanying the study of school vouchers. Subsequent evalua-
tions of voucher programs in New York, Washington, D.C., and Dayton,
Ohio have been designed in such a way as to allow for the collection of
higher-quality information about student test score outcomes and parental
assessments of public and private schools. Because vouchers in these cities
were awarded by lot, program evaluations could be designed as randomized
ﬁeld trials. Prior to conducting the lotteries, the evaluation team collected
baseline data on student test scores and family background characteristics.
One, two, and three years later, the evaluation team again tested the stu-
dents and asked parents about their children’s school experiences.2 In the
absence of response biases that are conditional on treatment status, any sta-
tistically signiﬁcant diﬀerences between students oﬀered a voucher and
those not oﬀered a voucher may be attributed to the intervention, because
average student initial abilities and family backgrounds are similar between
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1. Disparate ﬁndings have emerged from these studies. For example, one analysis of the Mil-
waukee choice experiment found test score gains in reading and math, particularly after stu-
dents had been enrolled for three or more years, whereas another study found gains only in
math, and a third found gains in neither subject. See Greene, Peterson, and Du (1998); Rouse
(1997); and Witte (1997). On the Cleveland program, see Greene, Howell, and Peterson (1998)
and Metcalf et al. (1998). Greene, Peterson, and Du (1998) report results from analyses of ex-
perimental data; the other studies are based upon analyses of nonexperimental data.
2. Results from the Dayton evaluation after one year are reported in Howell and Peterson
(2000). Second-year results for Dayton are described in West, Peterson, and Campbell (2001).
First-year results for Washington are reported in Wolf, Howell, and Peterson (2000). Second-
year results for Washington are reported in Wolf, Peterson, and West (2001). First-year results
from the New York City evaluation are reported in Peterson et al. (1999). Second-year results
from New York City are described in David Myers et al. (2000). All of the occasional papers
mentioned in this note are available at [http://data.fas.harvard.edu/pepg/].the two groups. Students and families who were evaluated entered private
school in grades two through ﬁve in New York City and grades two through
eight in Washington, D.C. and Dayton (and other parts of Montgomery
County, Ohio).3This chapter reports programmatic impacts on student test
scores, parents’ satisfaction with their child’s school, and parent reports of
the characteristics of the schools the child attended.
4.1 The Three Voucher Programs
The design of the three voucher programs was similar in key respects,
thereby allowing the evaluation team to combine results from the separate
evaluations of these programs. All were privately funded; all were targeted
at students from low-income families, most of whom lived within the cen-
tral city; and all provided partial vouchers, which the family was expected
to supplement from other resources. All students included in the evaluation
had previously been attending public schools. The programs, however, did
diﬀer in size, timing, and certain administrative details. In this section we
describe the main characteristics of the School Choice Scholarships Foun-
dation program in New York City, the Washington Scholarship Fund pro-
gram in Washington, D.C., and the Parents Advancing Choice in Educa-
tion program in the Dayton metropolitan area.
4.1.1 The School Choice Scholarships Foundation
Program in New York City
In February 1997, the School Choice Scholarships Foundation (SCSF)
announced that it would provide 1,300 scholarships worth up to $1,400 an-
nually for at least three years to children from low-income families then at-
tending public schools. The scholarship could be applied toward the cost of
attending a private school, either religious or secular. After announcing the
program, SCSF received initial applications from over 20,000 students be-
tween February and late April 1997.
To be eligible for a scholarship, children had to be entering grades one
through ﬁve, live in New York City, attend a public school at the time of ap-
plication, and come from families with incomes low enough to qualify for
the U.S. government’s free or reduced school lunch program. To ascertain
eligibility, students and an adult member of their family were asked to at-
tend veriﬁcation sessions during which family income and the child’s public
school attendance were documented.
Subsequent to the lottery, SCSF assisted families in identifying possible
private schools their children might attend. By the end of the ﬁrst year,
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3. Baseline data from the D.C. and Dayton evaluations are reported in Peterson et al. (1998).
Baseline data for New York City are reported in Peterson et al. (1997). Both of these reports
are available at [http://data.fas.harvard.edu/pepg/].about 82 percent of the students participating in the evaluation were using
a scholarship; 79 percent of the participating students used the voucher for
two full years, and 70 percent for three full years.4
4.1.2 The Parents Advancing Choice in
Education Program in Dayton, Ohio
In the spring of 1998, Parents Advancing Choice in Education (PACE),
a privately funded nonproﬁt corporation, oﬀered low-income families
within the Dayton metropolitan area an opportunity to win a scholarship
to help defray the costs of attending the school of their choice. Eligible ap-
plicants participated in a lottery in which winners were oﬀered a scholar-
ship that could be used at participating private and public schools in Day-
ton and in other parts of Montgomery County, Ohio. Students entering
kindergarten through twelfth grade qualiﬁed. For the 1998–99 school year,
PACE oﬀered scholarships to 515 students who were in public schools and
250 students who were already enrolled in private schools.
The program was announced in January 1998. Based on census data and
administrative records, program operators estimated that approximately
32,000 students met the program’s income and eligibility requirements. The
PACE program accepted preliminary applications from over 3,000 stu-
dents, of whom 1,500 attended sessions where administrators veriﬁed their
eligibility for a scholarship, students took the Iowa Test of Basic Skills
(ITBS), and parents completed questionnaires. These veriﬁcation sessions
were held in February, March, and April 1998. The lottery was then con-
ducted on 29 April 1998.
During the ﬁrst year of the program, the PACE scholarships covered 50
percent of tuition at a private school, up to a maximum award of $1,200.
Support was guaranteed for eligible students for at least four years; in ad-
dition, the program expects to support students through the completion of
high school, provided funds remain available. Scholarship amounts were
augmented beginning in 1999 as a result of additional funds available to
PACE and support for the program by the Children’s Scholarship Fund, a
nationwide school choice scholarship program.
Among the public school students oﬀered a scholarship, 78 percent of the
students participating in the evaluation attended a private school in the pro-
gram’s ﬁrst year, and 60 percent were in private schools after two years.
4.1.3 The Washington Scholarship Fund Program in Washington, D.C.
The Washington Scholarship Fund (WSF), a privately funded school
voucher program, was originally established in 1993. At that time, a limited
number of scholarships, which could be used at a private school of the fam-
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4. For a description of the kinds of private schools voucher students attended, see Howell
et al. (2002).ily’s choice, were oﬀered to students from low-income families. By the fall
of 1997, WSF was serving approximately 460 children at 72 private schools.
The WSF then received a large infusion of new funds from two philanthro-
pists, and a major expansion of the program was announced in October
1997. Both general news announcements and paid advertising were used to
publicize the enlarged school choice scholarship program. The WSF an-
nounced that, in the event that applications exceeded scholarship resources,
winners would be chosen by lottery. The program expanded further in 1999
with support from the Children’s Scholarship Fund.
To qualify, applicants had to reside in Washington, D.C. and be entering
grades K-8 in the fall of 1998. The WSF awarded parents with incomes at
or below the poverty line vouchers that equaled 60 percent of tuition or
$1,700, whichever was less. Families with incomes above the poverty line re-
ceived smaller scholarships. The maximum amount of tuition support for
high school students was $2,200. The WSF has said that it will attempt to
continue tuition support to the children in its program for at least three
years and, if funds are available, until they complete high school. No fam-
ily with income above 2.7 times the poverty line was eligible for support.
Over 7,500 telephone applications to the program were received between
October 1997 and March 1998; in response to invitations sent by WSF, over
3,000 applicants attended veriﬁcation and testing sessions. The lottery se-
lecting scholarship winners was held in April 1998. The WSF awarded over
1,000 new scholarships that year, with 811 going to students not previously
in a private school.
Provided they gained admission, scholarship students could attend any
private school in the Washington area. During the 1998–99 school year, stu-
dents participating in the evaluation attended seventy-two diﬀerent private
schools. Of those students oﬀered scholarships who participated in the eval-
uation, 68 percent attended a private school in the ﬁrst year of the program.
Take-up rates declined to 47 percent in the second year and to just 29 per-
cent at the end of the third year.
4.2 Evaluation Procedures
The evaluation procedures used in all three evaluations conform to those
used in randomized ﬁeld trials. The evaluation team collected baseline data
prior to the lottery, administered the lottery, and then collected follow-up
information one and two years later. This section details the steps taken to
collect the relevant information.
4.2.1 Baseline Data Collection
During the eligibility veriﬁcation sessions attended by voucher appli-
cants, students in ﬁrst grade and higher took the Iowa Test of Basic Skills
(ITBS) in reading and mathematics. The sessions took place during the
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lottery, and generally lasted about two hours. The sessions were held in
private-school classrooms, where schoolteachers and administrators served
as proctors under the overall supervision of the evaluation team and pro-
gram sponsors. The producer of the ITBS graded the tests.5 Students in
grades four through eight also completed a short questionnaire about their
school experiences.
While children were being tested, adults accompanying them ﬁlled out
surveys that asked about their satisfaction with their children’s schools,
their involvement in their children’s education, and their demographic char-
acteristics. Parents completed these questionnaires in rooms separate from
those used for testing. Administrators explained that individual responses
to the questionnaire would be held in strict conﬁdence. Respondents had
considerable time to complete their surveys, and administrators were avail-
able to answer questions about the meaning of particular items. Extensive
information from these surveys has been reported elsewhere.6
Over 5,000 public-school students participated in baseline testing in
New York City. After vouchers were awarded, 960 families were selected at
random from those who did not win the lottery to comprise a control group
of approximately 960 families.7
In Dayton, 1,440 students were tested at baseline, and 1,232 parent ques-
tionnaires were completed. Of the 1,440 students, 803 were not at the time
attending a private school; of the 1,232 parent questionnaires, 690 were
completed by parents of students who were not attending a private school.
Follow-up testing information is reported only for families whose children
attended public schools at the time of application.
In Washington, D.C., 2,023 students were tested at baseline; 1,928 parent
surveys asking questions about each child were completed; 938 student sur-
veys were completed. Of the 2,023 students tested, 1,582 were not attending
a private school at the time of application for a scholarship; of the 1,928 par-
ent questionnaires, 1,446 were completed by parents whose children were
not then attending a private school. Follow-up testing and survey informa-
tion was obtained only from families with children then in public schools.
4.2.2 The Lottery
The evaluation team conducted the lotteries in May 1997 in New York
City and April 1998 in Dayton and D.C. Program operators notiﬁed lottery
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5. The assessment used in this study is Form M of the Iowa Tests of Basic Skills, Copyright
(c) 1996 by The University of Iowa, published by The Riverside Publishing Company, 425
Spring Lake Drive, Itasca, Illinois 60143-2079. All rights reserved.
6. See Howell et al. (2002). Prior reports include Peterson et al. (1999); Myers et al. (2000);
Howell and Peterson (2000); West, Peterson, and Campbell (2001); Wolf, Howell, and Peter-
son (2000); Wolf, Peterson, and West (2001). All reports available at [http://data.fas.harvard.
edu/pepg/].
7. Exact procedures for the formation of the control group are described in Hill, Rubin, and
Thomas (1998).winners shortly thereafter. If a family was selected, all children in that fam-
ily entering eligible grades were oﬀered a scholarship. Separate lotteries
were held in Dayton and D.C. for students then in public and private
schools, ensuring random assignment to test and control groups of those
families participating in the evaluation.
In New York City, Mathematica Policy Research (MPR) administered
the lottery; SCSF announced the winners. The SCSF decided in advance to
allocate 85 percent of the scholarships to applicants from public schools
whose average test scores were less than the citywide median. Consequently,
applicants from these schools, who represented about 70 percent of all ap-
plicants, were assigned a higher probability of winning a scholarship. In the
information reported in the tables, results have been adjusted by weighting
cases diﬀerentially so that they can be generalized to all eligible applicants
who would have come to the veriﬁcation sessions had they been invited, re-
gardless of whether or not they attended a low-performing school.
Because vouchers were allocated by a lottery conducted by the evaluation
team, those oﬀered scholarships should not be expected to diﬀer signiﬁ-
cantly from members of the control group (those who did not win a schol-
arship). For all three cities, baseline data conﬁrm this expectation. For in-
stance, in D.C., the baseline test scores of those entering grades two through
eight who were oﬀered a voucher averaged 29.6 national percentile points
in reading and 23.3 in mathematics; those not oﬀered the scholarship
scored, on average, 30.6 national percentile points in reading and 23.1
points in math. As in D.C., the demographic characteristics of those oﬀered
vouchers in Dayton and New York did not diﬀer signiﬁcantly from the
characteristics of those who were not oﬀered a voucher.8
4.2.3 Collection of Follow-Up Information
The annual collection of follow-up information commenced in New York
City in the spring of 1998 and in Dayton and D.C. in the spring of 1999.
Data collection procedures were similar across cities.
In New York City, testing and questionnaire administration procedures
replicated those followed at baseline. Adult members of the family com-
pleted surveys that asked a wide range of questions about the educational
experiences of their oldest child within the age range eligible for a scholar-
ship. Students completed the ITBS and short questionnaires. Both the
voucher students and students in the control group were tested in locations
other than the school they were then attending.
The SCSF conditioned the renewal of scholarships on participation in
the evaluation. Also, non–scholarship winners selected to become members
of the control group were compensated for their expenses and told that they
could automatically reapply for a new lottery if they participated in these
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8. For a more extended discussion on these matters, see the initial reports for each city cited
in notes 2 and 3.follow-up sessions. Detailed response rate information for the follow-up
survey and testing sessions is reported in appendix A.
In Washington, D.C. and Dayton, the evaluation team began collecting
follow-up information between late February and late April of 1999. As in
New York, the procedures used to obtain follow-up data were essentially
the same as those used to collect baseline data. Students again took the
ITBS in mathematics and reading. Caretakers accompanying the children
completed surveys that asked a wide range of questions about the educa-
tional experiences of the children. Students in grades four through eight
also completed a questionnaire that asked about their experiences at school.
Testing and questionnaire administration procedures were similar to those
that had been followed at baseline.9 The Dayton evaluation was concluded
after two years; in D.C., however, a third-year follow-up collection of test-
ing and survey information was conducted in 2001.
To obtain a high participation rate in the follow-up data collection eﬀort,
those who had declined the oﬀer of a voucher and members of the control
group were compensated for their expenses. They were also told in Wash-
ington, D.C. that if they participated in the follow-up sessions, they would be
included in a new lottery. In Dayton, a second lottery was promised as a re-
ward for participating in the ﬁrst follow-up session. In the second year, how-
ever, Dayton families were only given ﬁnancial rewards for participation.
Because test score results from the second and third years of the evalua-
tion diﬀer signiﬁcantly between African American students and those from
other ethnic backgrounds, the ethnic composition of the students partici-
pating in the evaluation is particularly salient. Forty-two percent of the stu-
dents participating in the second year of the evaluation in New York City
were African Americans. In Dayton and D.C., 74 percent and 95 percent
were African American, respectively. Hispanic students participating in the
second year of the evaluation constituted 51 percent of the total in New York
City, 2 percent in Dayton, and 4 percent in Washington, D.C. Finally, 5 per-
cent of the students participating in the evaluation in New York City were
white. In Dayton and D.C., 24 percent and 1 percent were white, respectively.
The remaining students came from a variety of other ethnic backgrounds.
4.3 Data Analysis and Reporting Procedures
The evaluation takes advantage of the fact that a lottery was used to
award scholarships. As a result, it is possible to compare two groups of stu-
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9. Diﬃculties were encountered in the administration of the ﬁrst-year follow-up test at the
initial pilot session in Washington, D.C. Test booklets were not available at the testing site for
scholarship students in grades three through eight. Copies of the test arrived eventually, but
the amount of time available for testing may have been foreshortened. Signiﬁcant eﬀects on
reading scores are not apparent, but signiﬁcant eﬀects on math performance are evident,
probably because the math test was the last to be administered. Statistical adjustments in the
test score analysis take into account the special circumstances of the pilot session.dents that were similar, on average, except that members of the control
group were not oﬀered a scholarship. Any statistically signiﬁcant diﬀer-
ences between the two groups may be attributed to the school experience,
not the child’s initial ability or family background, which were essentially
the same at baseline. One possible threat to the validity of this causal infer-
ence would be diﬀerential response patterns to follow-up testing by mem-
bers of the treatment and control groups based on conditions that devel-
oped after they were tested at baseline.10 We  discuss that possibility in
appendix A (see also Howell et al. 2002; Howell and Peterson 2002).
This paper provides data that help answer two questions. The ﬁrst is what
the impact on educational outcomes was of an oﬀer of a voucher to low-
income families residing within a large central city. This is the intention-to-
treat or ITT eﬀect of the voucher. The ITT eﬀect compares educational out-
comes of those who were oﬀered a voucher to the outcomes of those who
were not oﬀered a voucher. To compute program impacts on children’s test
scores, we estimated a statistical model that took into account students’
treatment or control group status as well as baseline reading and math test
scores. Baseline test scores were included to (a) adjust for minor baseline
diﬀerences between the treatment and control groups on the achievement
tests, and (b) to increase the precision of the estimated impacts.
Generalization from these results has the important disadvantage of as-
suming that usage rates of scholarships are ﬁxed. Depending upon the size of
the scholarship, the time the scholarship is oﬀered, and the marketing of the
program as a whole, however, usage rates might be highly variable. Conse-
quently, we report ITT results for test scores in appendix B. In the text of this
chapter we report answers to a second question: What was the impact on ed-
ucational experiences, parental satisfaction, and test score performances of
students from low-income families residing within a large central city one,
two, and three years after switching from a public to a private school? This is
the treatment-on-the-treated or TOT eﬀect of the voucher. The answer to this
question requires a comparison between those students who were oﬀered
vouchers and switched from a public to a private school with public-school
students who would have switched to a private school had they been oﬀered a
voucher. To compute the program’s impact on those who used a scholarship
to attend a private school, we estimated two-stage least squares models. The
instrument is the voucher lottery, which is highly correlated with attendance at
a private school, but because it is randomly determined, is obviously uncorre-
lated with the error term in the second-stage equation. As a result, the model
yields an unbiased estimate of the eﬀects of switching to a private school.11
The paper reports the TOT impact on students school experiences,
parental satisfaction, and test score performance of a switch from a public
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10. We are indebted to Derek Neal for calling this interesting contingency to our attention.
11. This procedure is discussed in Angrist, Imbens, and Rubin (1996). The procedure, widely
used by statisticians to correct for selection eﬀects, was used to estimate the eﬀects of actual
class size reduction in Tennessee; see Krueger (1999).to a private school for one, two, and three years. Second- and third-year re-
sults compare those in private schools for two or three years with compa-
rable members of the control group that were not in private school for two
and three years, respectively.
4.4 Test Score Findings
We compare the performance of public and private school students on
the ITBS in reading and mathematics, as well as their combined perfor-
mance in both subject areas. Scores range between 0 and 100 National Per-
centile Ranking (NPR) points, with the national median located at the 50th
percentile. The results reported below represent the ﬁrst student achieve-
ment information from randomized ﬁeld trials on the eﬀects of school
vouchers. However, they do not so much break new ground as build upon a
body of research that has explored the diﬀerences between schooling for
low-income minorities in the public and private sectors.
4.4.1 Prior Research
Studies of attainment levels and test performance of students in public
and private schools usually ﬁnd that low-income and African American
students attending private schools outperform their public school peers.
According to a recent analysis of 12,000 students in the National Longitu-
dinal Survey of Youth, for instance, even when adjustments are made for
family background, students from all racial and ethnic groups are more
likely to go to college if they attended a Catholic school; however, the eﬀects
are the greatest among urban minorities (Neal 1997). This study’s findings
are consistent with others’ (Evans and Schwab 1993; Figlio and Stone
1999). After reviewing the literature on school eﬀects on learning, Uni-
versity of Wisconsin Professor John Witte (1996) concludes that the
empirical literature “indicate[s] a substantial private school advantage in
terms of completing high school and enrolling in college, both very impor-
tant events in predicting future income and well-being. Moreover, . . . the
eﬀects were most pronounced for students with achievement test scores in
the bottom half of the distribution” (167).
Even the most careful of studies, however, can take into account only ob-
served family background characteristics. They cannot be sure that they
have controlled for an intangible factor—the willingness of parents to pay
for their child’s tuition, and all that this implies about the importance they
place on education. As a result, it remains unclear whether the ﬁndings from
these studies describe actual diﬀerences between public and private schools
or simply diﬀerences in the kinds of students and families attending them.12
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12. Major studies ﬁnding positive educational beneﬁts from attending private schools in-
clude Coleman, Hoﬀer, and Kilgore (1982) and Chubb and Moe (1997). Critiques of these
studies have been prepared by Goldberger and Cain (1982) and Wilms (1985).The best solution to the self-selection problem is the random assignment
of students to test and control groups. Until recently, evaluations of voucher
programs have not utilized a random-assignment research design and
therefore have not overcome the possible selection problems. Privately
funded programs in Indianapolis, San Antonio, and Milwaukee admitted
students on a ﬁrst-come, ﬁrst-served basis. In the state-funded program in
Cleveland, although scholarship winners were initially selected by means of
a lottery, eventually all applicants were oﬀered a scholarship, thereby pre-
cluding the conduct of a randomized experiment. The public Milwaukee
program did award vouchers by a lottery, but data collection was incom-
plete.13
As a consequence, the ﬁndings presented here on New York, D.C., and
Dayton provide a unique opportunity to examine the eﬀects of school
vouchers on students from low-income families who live in central cities. In
contrast to prior studies, random assignment was conducted by the evalua-
tion team, follow-up test-score information was obtained from about one-
half to four-ﬁfths of the students who participated in the lottery, and base-
line data provided information that allowed the analysts to adjust for
non-response.
4.4.2 Impacts of Private-School Attendance on Test Scores
In interpreting the ﬁndings reported below, emphasis is placed on the es-
timated eﬀects of attending a private school on combined test scores for all
three cities, taken together. Because of minor ﬂuctuations in data collec-
tion, average estimates from more than one city provide a better indication
of programmatic eﬀects than do the results from any one city. Also, when
student performance is estimated on the basis of one-hour testing sessions,
combined test score performance of students on the reading and math tests
is a better indicator of student achievement than either test separately. The-
oretically, the more test items used to evaluate performance, the more likely
it is that one will estimate performance accurately. Empirically, perfor-
mances on the two tests are highly correlated with one another (r equals
about 0.7). In addition, results from the two tests, when combined together,
were found to be more stable across time and from place to place, indicat-
ing that combining results from the two tests reduces what is probably idio-
syncratic variations in observations of student performance.14
As can be seen in table 4.1, the impact of private school attendance on
student test score performance diﬀered for African Americans and mem-
bers of other ethnic groups. One observes no signiﬁcant diﬀerences between
the test score performance of non–African American students switching
from a public to a private school and the performance of their peers in the
control group, after one, two, or three years. Nor were signiﬁcant diﬀer-
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13. Results from these evaluations are reported in Peterson and Hassel (1998).
14. This procedure was also employed in Krueger (1999).ences observed in these students’ reading and math tests, considered sepa-
rately.
The eﬀects of switching to a private school on African American students
diﬀered markedly from the eﬀects on students from other ethnic back-
grounds. In the three cities, taken together, African American students who
switched from public to private schools scored, after one year, 3.9 NPR
points higher on the combined math and reading tests, and, after two and
three years, 6.3 percentile and 6.6 points higher, respectively, than the
African American students in the control group. Again, these are the aver-
age results for the three cities combined, weighting each city estimate in in-
verse proportion to its respective variance.
The ﬁndings for each city are reported in tables 4.2, 4.3, and 4.4. The
largest diﬀerences after three years were observed in New York City. In this
city, African American students attending private schools for three years
scored 9.2 percentile points higher on the two tests combined than did stu-
dents in the control group. In D.C., however, no signiﬁcant diﬀerences were
observed after three years, despite the fact that large two-year eﬀects were
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Table 4.1 The Impact in Three Cities of Switching to a Private School on Test
Score Performance
Year One Year Two Year Three
Test Score Performance (Percentiles) (Percentiles) (Percentiles)
African Americans
Overall 3.9* 6.3*** 6.6**
(2.0) (2.5) (2.8)
Math 6.1*** 6.1** 4.2*
(2.4) (3.1) (2.2)
Reading 2.1 5.9** 4.2
(2.4) (2.9) (3.5)
All other ethnic groups
Overall –1.6 –1.4 –3.5
(2.4) (2.9) (2.7)
Math –2.5 –2.6 –2.7
(3.1) (3.9) (3.3)
Reading –0.7 –0.2 –4.2
(2.5) (3.0) (2.9)
Notes: Figures represent the average impact of switching to a private school on test score per-
formance scores in New York, D.C., and Dayton. Averages are based upon eﬀects observed in
the three cities weighted by the inverse of the variance of the point estimates. Standard errors
reported in parentheses. For African Americans, the unweighted average eﬀects after one year
are 2.7 overall, 4.8 in math, and 0.6 in reading; after two years, the unweighted average eﬀect
sizes are 6.6 overall, 6.5 in math, and 6.8 in reading. All models control for baseline test scores
and lottery indicators. Impacts expressed in national percentile rankings.
***Signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level, two-tailed test.
**Signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.
*Signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level.Table 4.2 Impact in New York of Switching to a Private School on Test Score Performance
Year One Year Two Year Three
Test Score Performance (Percentiles) N (Percentiles) N (Percentiles) N
African Americans
Overall 5.4*** 622 4.4** 497 9.2*** 519
(1.5) (2.0) (2.4)
Math 6.9*** 622 4.1* 497 11.8*** 519
(1.8) (2.5) (2.9)
Reading 4.0** 622 4.5** 497 6.7** 519
(1.8) (2.3) (2.9)
All other ethnic groups
Overall –2.2 812 –1.5 699 –3.5 729
(1.8) (2.2) (2.4)
Math –3.2 812 –3.2 699 –2.5 729
(2.3) (2.9) (2.9)
Reading –1.2 812 0.2 699 –4.4* 729
(1.9) (2.3) (2.6)
Notes: Weighted two-stage least squares regressions performed; treatment status used as instrument.
Standard errors reported in parentheses. All models control for baseline test scores and lottery indicators.
Impacts expressed in terms of national percentile rankings.
***Signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level, two-tailed test.
**Signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.
*Signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level.
Table 4.3 Impact in Dayton of Switching to a Private School on Test
Score Performance
Year One Year Two
Test Score Performance (Percentiles) N (Percentiles) N
African Americans
Overall 3.3 296 6.5* 273
(3.5) (3.7)
Math 0.4 296 5.3 273
(4.0) (4.3)
Reading 6.1 296 7.6* 273
(4.2) (4.2)
All other ethnic groups
Overall 1.0 108 –0.2 96
(6.4) (9.0)
Math –0.8 108 0.0 96
(7.5) (10.7)
Reading 2.8 108 –0.4 96
(7.1) (9.9)
Notes: Weighted two-stage least squares regressions performed; treatment status used as in-
strument. All models control for baseline test scores. Impacts expressed in terms of national
percentile rankings. Standard errors reported in parentheses.
*Signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level.observed. In Dayton, the diﬀerence in combined test score performance was
6.5 percentile points after two years, the total duration of the evaluation.
The trend over time also varies from one city to the next. As can be seen
in table 4.2, in New York City, substantial test score diﬀerences between
African American students in private and public schools appear at the end
of the ﬁrst year (5.4 percentile points) and attenuate slightly in the second
year (4.4 points) but increase to 9.2 percentile points in year three. In this
city, test score gains appeared to grow over time.
In Dayton, there was a steady upward trend in the combined test score
performance of African Americans between years one and two. Table 4.3
shows that African American students who switched from public to private
schools performed 3.3 percentile points higher on the combined test in year
one and 6.5 percentile points higher in year two. Once again, a model of ac-
cumulated gains could account for the ﬁndings.
The most uncertain results for African Americans come from Washing-
ton, D.C. As can be seen in table 4.4, no signiﬁcant diﬀerences were ob-
served in year one, a large impact was observed after two years, but no im-
pact was observed at the end of year three. Three factors could account for
such disparate ﬁndings. First, because only 29 percent of the students in the
evaluation continued to use the voucher after three years (as compared to
70 percent in New York City), third-year estimations are quite imprecise.
Second, the voucher experiment in D.C. was contaminated by the inaugu-
ration of a charter-school initiative that gave families more choices than
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Table 4.4 Impact in D.C. of Switching to a Private School on Test Score Performance
Year One Year Two Year Three
Test Score Performance (Percentiles) N (Percentiles) N (Percentiles) N
African Americans
Overall –0.9 891 9.2*** 668 –1.9 656
(2.8) (2.9) (4.4)
Math 7.3** 891 10.4*** 668 0.9 656
(3.3) (3.4) (1.9)
Reading –9.0** 891 8.0*** 668 –4.6 656
(3.7) (3.4) (5.4)
All other ethnic groups
Overall 7.4 39 –0.1 42 –1.8 31
(8.7) (9.8) (13.3)
Math 8.5 39 7.3 42 –9.5 31
(10.7) (13.4) (15.4)
Reading 6.3 39 –7.6 42 5.9 31
(12.7) (10.1) (18.7)
Notes: Weighted two-stage least squares regressions performed; treatment status used as instrument.
Standard errors reported in parentheses. All models control for baseline test scores; in year one, models
also control for initial testing session. Impacts expressed in terms of national percentile rankings.
***Signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level, two-tailed test.
**Signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.those available in New York City; indeed, 17 percent of the treatment group
and 24 percent of the control group in D.C. attended charter schools in the
third year of the evaluation. Finally, the diﬀerences in the third-year results
might be attributed to the more established private sector in New York City
than in Washington, D.C. Catholic schools, the major provider of private
education in the two cities, are better endowed and historically more rooted
in the northern port city, whose Catholic, immigrant population dates back
to the early nineteenth century.15
4.4.3 Interpreting the Magnitude of the Test Score Eﬀects
Overall, the eﬀects of attending a private school on student test scores are
moderately large. As can be seen in table 4.5, black students who switched
to private schools scored, after one year, 0.18 standard deviations higher
than the students in the control group. After two and three years, the size of
the eﬀect grew to 0.28 and 0.30 standard deviations, respectively, more than
a quarter of the diﬀerence in test score performances between blacks and
whites nationwide (Jencks and Phillips 1999). Continuing evaluations of
voucher programs may provide information on whether or not these gains
can be consolidated and extended.
Another way of assessing the magnitude of these eﬀects is to compare
them to those observed in an evaluation of a class size reduction interven-
tion conducted in Tennessee, the only other major education reform to be
subjected to evaluation by means of a randomized ﬁeld trial. The eﬀects on
African Americans of attendance at a private school shown here are com-
parable to the estimated eﬀect of a seven-student reduction in class size. Ac-
cording to a recent reanalysis of data from Tennessee, the class size eﬀect
for African Americans after two years was, on average, between 7 and 8 per-
centile points (Krueger and Whitmore 2000).
It is also of interest to compare the size of the eﬀects of the voucher in-
tervention with the size of the eﬀects reported in a RAND study entitled
Improving School Achievement,released in August 2000 (Flanagan, Kawata,
and Williamson 2000, 59). Identifying the most successful states, Texas and
North Carolina, which have introduced rigorous accountability systems
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15. For a fuller discussion, see Howell et al. (2002, chaps. 2, 6).
Table 4.5 Size of the Eﬀects of Switching to a Private School on African
Americans’ Overall Test Score Performances (standard deviations)
Test Score Performance Year One Year Two Year Three
Overall 0.18 0.28 0.30
Math 0.28 0.28 0.18
Reading 0.08 0.23 0.16
Note:Figures represent the unweighted average impact of switching to a private school on test
scores in New York, D.C., and Dayton expressed in standard deviations.that involve statewide testing, the study ﬁnds what it says are “remarkable”
one-year gains in math scores in these states of “as much as 0.06 to 0.07
standard deviation[s] per year”—or 0.18 to 0.21 over three years. The three-
year eﬀects of the school voucher intervention on black students observed
here are somewhat larger.
4.4.4 Cost-Beneﬁt Analysis
What are these test score gains for African Americans likely to mean in
terms of future economic beneﬁts? Richard Murname and his colleagues
have calculated the eﬀects of math achievement on future earnings (Mur-
name et al. 2000). According to one estimate, a 0.30 standard deviation in-
crease in average math achievement, if sustained, will yield a 5 percent gain
in earnings seven to ten years after the student ﬁnishes high school. If an
African American student in the control group was expected to earn about
$30,000 a year in his late twenties, a comparable student who had switched
from public to private school would be expected to earn an additional
$1,500 per year.
This suggests that investments in vouchers might yield a moderate rate of
return for African American families. Why, then, don’t families make this
investment on their own? If a control group family had simply absorbed the
cost of the voucher (on average, about $1,200), even a rough calculation of
the rate of return suggests that it would be an attractive investment, pro-
vided that families can borrow moneys at conventional rates. Credit con-
straints are a possible explanation for the decision not to utilize a private
school on the part of control group families. Private lenders may be reluc-
tant to make long-term loans at conventional lending rates to low-income
borrowers, who may be high credit risks. If families can borrow the money
only at rates charged to high-risk users of bank cards, then the rate of return
on an investment in private schooling, although probably still positive,
would be considerably less attractive—unless a family perceives nonpecu-
niary beneﬁts of a private education.
Clearly, though, the lower the initial costs, the more attractive an invest-
ment in private schooling becomes. When a voucher reduces the amount
that needs to be borrowed from around $2,400 a year (a rough estimate of
the average cost of private school tuition, fees, books, and uniforms in these
cities) to half that amount, families may decide that the beneﬁts of an in-
vestment in private schooling now outweigh the costs. Perhaps this explains
why a small voucher induced many low-income families to make the addi-
tional investment, even when members of a similarly situated control group
(who did not receive the voucher oﬀer) were less likely to do so.16
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16. A careful analysis of this question would require a fuller examination of the probable
economic beneﬁts of test score gains, the cost of private schooling, and the interest rates faced
by various classes of potential borrowers.4.4.5 Additional Methodological Considerations
This section addresses two methodological considerations. The ﬁrst in-
volves the status of background control variables. In table 4.6we report sec-
ond- and third-year results for African Americans from statistical models
that control not only for initial test scores (as do the analyses in the previ-
ous tables) but also for mother’s education, mother’s employment status,
family size, and whether or not the family received welfare beneﬁts. The es-
timated impacts on the test scores of African Americans of switching from
a public to a private school in the three cities remain almost exactly the
same: 6.4 percentile points in the second year and (though not shown)
6.7 percentile points in the third. Minor diﬀerences are observed when
impacts within each individual city are estimated. For instance, when we
estimate eﬀects in New York City in the second year without controlling
for family background characteristics, the impact is 4.3 NPR points; when
family background controls are added, the impact is 4.5 NPR points. In
Dayton, Ohio, when controls are introduced, the point estimate drops from
6.5 to 5.9 NPR points. In Washington, D.C., the estimated impact after two
years remains 9.2 NPR points.
The second methodological consideration concerns the possibility that
African Americans posted signiﬁcant eﬀects because they received a more
uniform treatment. If the black students who used vouchers were dispro-
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Table 4.6 Estimated Eﬀects after Two Years of Switching from a Public to a
Private School on African Americans’ Combined Test Scores, With and
Without Controls for Family Background Characteristics
Private School Impact, Private School Impact,
Original Results Controlling for Family Background
Three-city average impact 6.3*** 6.4**
(2.5) (2.5)
New York City 4.4** 4.5**
(2.0) (2.0)
Dayton, Ohio 6.5* 5.9
(3.7) (3.8)
Washington, D.C. 9.2*** 9.2***
(2.9) (2.8)
Notes: P-values reported in parentheses. Weighted two-stage least squares regressions per-
formed; treatment status used as instrument. All models control for baseline test scores,
mother’s education, employment status, whether or not the family receives welfare, and fam-
ily size (missing case values for demographic variables estimated by imputation); New York
model also includes lottery indicators. Impacts expressed in terms of national percentile rank-
ings. Average three-city impact is based on eﬀects observed in the three cities weighted by the
inverse of the standard errors of the point estimates.
***Signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level.
**Signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.
*Signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level.portionately concentrated in a small number of good private schools, or
their peers in the control group concentrated disproportionately in a few
bad public schools, the error term in the estimation of private school eﬀects
would be smaller for African Americans than for other students. This
would increase the probability that one would observe signiﬁcant impacts
on African American test scores, but not on those of other ethnic groups.
For two reasons, however, we doubt this explanation has much traction.
First, the size of the standard errors is not all that diﬀerentiates the eﬀects for
African Americans and members of the other ethnic groups. For Latinos in
New York and whites in Dayton, the point estimates consistently hover
around zero, whereas for African Americans in both cities the point estimates
are quite large. Second, when surveying the private school attendance pat-
terns of students from diﬀerent ethnic groups, one ﬁnds little evidence that
treatment eﬀects were more uniform for some groups than others. African
Americans, for the most part, did not attend a relatively smaller number of
public or private schools than did members of other ethnic groups.17
4.5 Parent Satisfaction
Most studies have found that families who use vouchers to attend an area
private school are much more satisﬁed with their schooling than are fami-
lies who remain in public schools.18 The results presented in table 4.7 con-
firm these earlier findings. A significantly higher proportion of private
school parents were “very satisfied” with the following aspects of their
schools: school safety, teaching, parental involvement, class size, school
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17. Since information about the distribution of students among schools is available from the
ﬁrst year of the Dayton evaluation, we were able to estimate the extent to which African Amer-
icans and non–African Americans were subject to uniform treatment simply by dividing the
number of students in a category by the number of schools they attended. On the whole, we
found fairly low uniformity of treatment and not much diﬀerence between racial groups. For
both African American and non–African American students receiving treatment, the degree
of concentration among schools was, on average, just three students. Among students in the
control group, the degree of concentration was 3 students per school for African Americans
and 1.3 students for non–African Americans. According to this estimation, then, some diﬀer-
ence in the degree of concentration between African American and non–African American
students is evident, but the diﬀerence is not large.
One may also estimate the degree of uniformity of treatment by examining the percentage
of students in the three schools serving the largest number of students. When one estimates in
this way, one again ﬁnds some diﬀerence between treatment and control groups. However, in
this case it is the non–African Americans who appear the most concentrated. A total of 37 per-
cent of the African American treatment students enrolled in just three schools, as compared
to 15 percent of the African American members of the control group. For non–African Amer-
icans, these ﬁgures were 56 percent and 16 percent, respectively. According to this estimate, the
nonblack members of the Dayton experiment experienced a more uniform dose of treatment
than did the black students in the study.
18. A summary of ﬁndings from earlier studies is available in Peterson (1998, 18). Schneider
et al. (1998) ﬁnds higher levels of parental satisfaction within New York City public schools
when parents are given a choice of school.facility, student respect for teachers, teacher communication with parents
with respect to their child’s progress, extent to which child can observe re-
ligious traditions, parental support for the school, discipline, clarity of
school goals, staﬀ teamwork, academic quality, the sports program, and
what is taught in school. Thirty-eight percent of private school parents
were very satisﬁed with the academic quality of the school after two years,
as contrasted with just 15 percent of the control group. Similarly, 44 per-
cent of the private school parents expressed the highest satisfaction with
“what’s taught in school,” compared with 15 percent of the control group.
To see whether satisfaction levels are the result of a Hawthorne eﬀect, the
propensity of individuals to welcome change for its own sake, an index of
satisfaction was constructed from the items reported above. The positive
impact on satisfaction levels in the three cities, as measured by this index,
was 0.97 standard deviations in the ﬁrst year, 0.89 in the second, and 0.85 in
the third year.19 In other words, although overall satisfaction levels attenu-
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Table 4.7 Parent Satisfaction with School, Two Years After Beginning of Voucher Programs
(% “very satisﬁed”)
Year Two
Switched to Public School Programmatic
Private School Control Group Impact
Parent Satisfaction Category (1) (2) (3)
What taught in school 44 15 29***
Ability to observe religious traditions 37 8 29***
School safety 44 16 27***
Teacher skills 43 17 26***
Teacher-parent relations 43 18 25***
Student respect for teachers 40 16 24***
Academic quality 38 15 23***
Teaching values 36 14 23***
Discipline 35 14 22***
Staﬀ teamwork 34 13 21***
Class size 32 12 20***
Clarity of school goals 34 14 20***
Parental involvement 30 15 15**
Location 40 33 7
Notes: These ﬁgures represent the average results for New York City, Dayton, and D.C. Observations
from each city are weighted by the inverse of their variance. Column (1) presents those who were oﬀered
a scholarship and subsequently used it to attend a private school. Column (2) presents those in the con-
trol group who would have used a scholarship had they been oﬀered one. Column (3) presents estimated
impact of participation in the program, using a two-stage least squares model.
***Signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level.
**Signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.
19. Procedures for constructing the index as well as additional information on satisfaction
levels are reported in Howell et al. (2002, chap. 7).ated slightly from the ﬁrst to the second and third years of the evaluation,
Hawthorne eﬀects appear minimal.
4.6 Other Voucher Impacts
Although test score performance and parental satisfaction are the out-
comes of greatest interest to most observers, parental surveys provided
additional information about the impacts of voucher opportunities on
selected characteristics of the schools attended by students. Signiﬁcant
diﬀerences were identiﬁed in the school facilities available to students,
school size, class size, school climate, homework assignment practices, and
school communication with families.
4.6.1 School Facilities
Public school expenditures eclipse private school expenditures. Nation-
wide, the average private school expenditures per pupil in 1993–94 were es-
timated at $3,116, considerably less than the $6,653 spent, on average, on
public school pupils (Coulson 1999, 277). In part, this disparity is due to the
wider array of services that public schools provide their students. Nonethe-
less, even when adjustments are made for the kinds of services rendered,
public schools in New York City, Dayton, and D.C. spend roughly twice as
much as private schools.
Per-pupil expenditures for both Catholic and public schools were avail-
able for schools in three boroughs of New York City.20 In comparing ex-
penditures, the amount spent by New York public schools for all items that
did not clearly have a private school counterpart was deducted. Among
other things, deductions were taken for all monies spent on transportation,
special education, school lunch, other ancillary services, and the cost of ﬁ-
nancing the far-ﬂung bureaucracy that runs the citywide, boroughwide,
and districtwide operations of the New York City public schools.
All these deductions from public school expenditures amounted to no less
than 40 percent of the cost of running the New York City public schools.
However, even after all these and other deductions were taken, public
schools were still spending over $5,000 per pupil each year, more than twice
the $2,400 spent on similar services in New York City’s Catholic schools.
In Washington, D.C., the median tuition at the private schools attended
by the scholarship students included in the evaluation was $3,113 in the
year 1998–99.21The average is substantially higher than the median because
of the high tuition charged by a few independent schools, such as Sidwell
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20. Estimates are based on information about Catholic schools in Manhattan, the Bronx,
and Brooklyn from an unpublished memorandum submitted to the Program on Education
Policy and Governance from the New York archdiocese in August 1999. Public school expen-
diture by school for the city of New York is available on the Board of Education website.
21. Private school tuition rates were estimated in part from information provided in Coer-
per and Mersereau (1998). For schools not listed in this volume, information was obtained inSchool Vouchers 127
Table 4.8 Size and Quality of School Facilities, One Year After Beginning of Voucher
Programs (%)
Switched to Public School Programmatic
Private School Control Group Impact
Parental Reports (1) (2) (3)
Average school size 278 450 –172***
Average class size 20 23 –3***
Percentage satisﬁed with school facilities 28 9 19***
Percentage with the following resources:
Special programs for non-English speakers 43 71 –28***
Nurses’ oﬃce 75 94 –19***
Special programs for learning disabled 67 81 –14***
Cafeteria 86 96 –10***
Child counselor 77 85 –8***
Library 92 96 –5**
Gym 88 88 0
Special programs for advanced learners 59 58 1
Arts program 82 81 1
Computer lab 86 84 2
Music program 88 84 4
After-school program 91 86 6**
Individual tutors 70 54 16***
Notes: See notes to table 4.7.
Friends, which charged the Clintons over $15,000 per year for their daugh-
ter’s tuition. Assuming that the ratio of tuition to total educational expen-
diture in Washington, D.C. is the same as in the three boroughs in New
York City discussed previously, private educational expenditures, on aver-
age, totaled roughly $4,000. Again, considering only those services and pro-
grams that both public and private schools cover, adjusted per-pupil ex-
penditures in Washington public schools reached $8,185, as estimated from
data for the 1995–96 school year.22
Much the same patterns emerge in Dayton. In 1998–99, students in the
Dayton voucher program paid, on average, $2,600 in tuition, whereas the
Dayton public school system spend an adjusted average of $5,528 per pupil.
Parental reports help explain these expenditure data. According to the
parental surveys, private schools were less likely to have a library, a nurse’s
oﬃce, a cafeteria, child counselors, and special programs for non–English
speakers and students with learning problems (see table 4.8). The greatest
diﬀerence was for programs for non-English-speaking students. Forty-
telephone conversations with school staﬀ. Some schools have a range of tuition charges, de-
pending on the number of students from the family attending the school and other factors. The
tuition used for this calculation is the maximum charged by the school. The tuition also in-
cludes all fees, except for the registration fee, which is ordinarily treated as partial payment to-
ward tuition. Figures are weighted proportionate to the number of students in the evaluation
attending a particular school. Public school expenditure includes the costs of transportation
and special education, which may not be provided by private schools.
22. Data taken from the U.S. Department of Education (2000).three percent of the private school parents reported such a program in their
school, compared with 71 percent of the control group parents. Similarly,
75 percent of the private school parents reported their school had a nurse’s
oﬃce, as compared to 94 percent of public school parents. Public schools
are also larger. In some instances, either no signiﬁcant diﬀerences were de-
tected or private school parents reported more services. The two groups of
parents did not diﬀer in their reports of the availability of a gym, a com-
puter laboratory, art and music programs, and special programs for ad-
vanced learners. Private school parents, meanwhile, were more likely to say
their school had individual tutors and an after-school program.
Despite the more limited ﬁnancial resources of the private school, par-
ents reported that their children attended classes with an average of twenty
students, as compared to twenty-three in public schools (Peterson, Myers,
and Howell 1998, table 5). However, the reduction in class size was only
three students, considerably less than the amount generally thought to be
necessary to achieve signiﬁcant gains from class size reduction.23 As esti-
mated by parents, the eﬀect of choosing the private sector was to reduce the
average size of the school by 172 students or nearly 40 percent—from an av-
erage of 450 students to 278 students.
4.6.2 School Climate
In their study of public and private schools, John Chubb and Terry Moe
(1990) found that the educational environment of private schools was more
conducive to learning than that of public schools. They pointed out that
public schools are governed by state laws, federal regulations, school board
requirements, and union-contract rules that impose multiple and not al-
ways consistent obligations on teachers and principals. Because they must
respond to numerous legal and contractual requirements, school adminis-
trators and teachers focus more on rule compliance than on educational
mission, undermining the morale of educators whose original objective was
to help children learn.
The problem, Chubb and Moe say, is particularly prevalent in big-city
schools. Urban private schools operate with greater autonomy, focus more
directly on their educational mission, and, as a result, achieve a higher de-
gree of internal cohesion. To do otherwise would jeopardize their survival
as fragile institutions dependent upon the annual recruitment of new stu-
dents. As a consequence, principals and teachers in the private sector enjoy
higher morale. Their interactions with one another and with their students
are more positive, fostering a more eﬀective learning environment.
Our ﬁndings conﬁrm Chubb and Moe’s. If parent reports are accurate, the
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23. The reduction in class size in the Tennessee experiment was an average of approximately
seven to eight students (Krueger 1999). For further discussion of this point, see Howell et al.
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Table 4.9 Parents’ Perceptions of School Climate, One Year After Beginning of Voucher
Programs (%)
Switched to Public School Programmatic
Private School Control Group Impact
Reported by Parents as Serious Problem (1) (2) (3)
Fighting 32 63 –31***
Kids missing class 26 48 –22***
Tardiness 33 54 –21***
Kids destroying property 22 42 –20***
Cheating 26 39 –13***
Notes: See notes to table 4.7.
Table 4.10 Homework, One Year After Beginning of Voucher Programs (%)
Switched to Public School Programmatic
Private School Control Group Impact
Reported by Parents (1) (2) (3)
Child has more than one hour 
of homework 72 56 16***
Diﬃculty of homework appropriate 
for child 90 72 18***
Notes: See notes to table 4.7.
scholarship programs in New York, D.C., and Dayton had a major impact
on the daily life of students at school. As table 4.9 shows, public school par-
ents were more likely to report that the following were serious problems at
their school: students destroying property, tardiness, missing classes, ﬁghting,
cheating, and racial conﬂict. For example, 32 percent of the private school
parents thought that ﬁghting was a serious problem at their school versus
63percent of the control group. Thirty-three percent of parents perceived tar-
diness as a problem, as compared to 54 percent of the control group. No more
than 22 percent of private school parents, but 42 percent of the control group,
said that destruction of property was a serious problem at their school.
4.6.3 Homework and Parental Communication
Thomas Hoﬀer, Andrew Greeley, and James Coleman (1985) have at-
tributed the higher level of student performance in private schools to the
amount of homework expected of students and to the frequency of com-
munication between schools and parents. The reports by parents are con-
sistent with their interpretation.24 Table 4.10 shows that 72 percent of
private school parents reported that their child had at least an hour of
24. For very similar ﬁrst-year results, see Peterson, Myers, and Howell (1998), table 9.homework a day, whereas only 56 percent of the control group parents re-
ported a similar amount of homework. Private school parents were also
more likely to say the homework was appropriate for their child. Seventy-
two percent of the control group parents gave this response, as compared to
90 percent of private-school parents.
Compared with control-group parents, parents of students in private
schools also said that they received more communication from their school
about their child. The results presented in table 4.11 indicate that a higher
percent of private school parents versus control group parents reported the
following: being more informed about student grades halfway through the
grading period; being notiﬁed when their child is sent to the oﬃce the ﬁrst
time for disruptive behavior; speaking to classes about their jobs; partici-
pating in instruction; receiving notes about their child from the teacher; re-
ceiving a newsletter about what is going on in school; and regular parent-
teacher conferences.
4.7 Conclusions
Because random assignment to test and control groups assures that all
signiﬁcant eﬀects may be attributed to the intervention, and not to the stu-
dents’ initial abilities or their family backgrounds, randomized ﬁeld trials
are the best available tool for detecting the eﬀects of an educational inter-
vention. Nonetheless, when one interprets the ﬁndings from the evaluation
of any one program in a particular city, generalizations to a larger universe
are problematic. Conditions speciﬁc to that place or minor ﬂuctuations in
testing conditions might skew results in one direction or another.
Still, when similar results emerge from evaluations of school voucher pro-
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Table 4.11 School Communication with Parents, One Year After Beginning of Voucher
Programs (%)
Switched to Public School Programmatic
Private School Control Group Impact
Reported by Parents (1) (2) (3)
Parents receive newsletter 88 68 20***
Parents participate in instrument 68 50 18***
Parents notiﬁed of disruptive behavior 91 77 14***
Parents receive notes from teacher 93 78 14***
Parents speak to classes about jobs 44 33 11**
Parents regularly informed about 
student grades 93 84 9**
Parent open houses held at school 95 90 5**
Regular parent-teacher conferences 95 90 5**
Notes: See notes to table 4.7.grams in three sites in diﬀerent parts of the United States, they provide a
stronger basis for drawing conclusions and generalizing to larger populations.
Thus, the average impact across the three sites may provide a reasonable esti-
mate of the likely initial impact of a school voucher initiative elsewhere.
In the three cases, taken together, we found eﬀects of school vouchers
only on the average test performance of African American students. Afri-
can American students who switched from public to private schools in the
three cities scored after two years, on average, approximately 6.3 percen-
tile points higher on the ITBS than comparable African Americans who
remained in public schools. After three years, private school attendance in
two cities had an impact of 6.6 percentile points, an eﬀect of 0.30 standard
deviations.
At this point we do not know why the gains from switching to a private
school are evident for African American  students after two and three years,
but not for students from other ethnic backgrounds. However, parents re-
ported that private schools are smaller in size, maintain a better disciplin-
ary climate, ask students to do more homework, maintain closer commu-
nication with families, and have somewhat smaller classes (about 3 fewer
pupils). These school characteristics may be particularly helpful to students
who are African American.
One must qualify any generalizations from the results of this pilot pro-
gram to a large-scale voucher program that would involve all children in a
large urban school system. Only a small fraction of low-income students in
these three cities’ schools were oﬀered vouchers, and these voucher students
constituted only a small proportion of the students attending private
schools in these cities. A much larger program could conceivably have quite
diﬀerent program outcomes.
Still, slightly larger voucher programs initially directed at low-income
families would attract those families with the greatest interest in exploring
an educational alternative, exactly the group that applied for a voucher in
these three cities. Thus, positive consequences of school choice reported
herein may prove encouraging to those who seek to extend and expand
school choices for low-income, inner-city families, and negative ﬁndings
may indicate problems that need to be addressed. It is hoped that additional
careful research will accompany larger programs established by private phi-
lanthropists and public authorities.
Appendix A
Response Rates
To promote high response rates, voucher program operators either required
or strongly urged recipients to participate in testing sessions if they wished
School Vouchers 131to have their voucher renewed for the next school year. In addition, evalua-
tion teams oﬀered ﬁnancial incentives and new opportunities to win a
voucher to encourage members of the control group and members of the
treatment group who remained in public schools to return for follow-up
testing.25Still, substantial numbers of students were not tested at the end of
one, two, and three years.
Response rates were 100 percent at baseline, because families and stu-
dents were not entered into the lottery unless they provided baseline in-
formation. Response rates after one year were 82 percent in New York, 56
percent in Dayton, and 63 percent in Washington, D.C. After two years,
response rates in the three cities were 66 percent, 49 percent, and 50 per-
cent, respectively. After three years, response rates were 67 percent in New
York and 60 percent in Washington, D.C. Response rates were similar
fort reatment and control groups in all three cities.26 The largest diﬀerence
was in New York City in the second year, where the treatment group’s re-
sponse rate was 7 points higher than the control group rate.27
Comparisons of baseline test scores and background characteristics re-
veal only minor diﬀerences between respondents and nonrespondents in all
three cities. Table 4A.1 presents, for example, baseline data on respondents
and nonrespondents in the treatment and control groups after two years in
the three cities; separate comparisons for African Americans are included
in table 4A.2. Some diﬀerences in race, welfare, and religious orientation
were detected, but they point in diﬀerent directions in diﬀerent cities and do
not appear to systematically produce a more advantaged group of respon-
dents in the treatment group or a particularly disadvantaged control group.
In all three cities, inter-group diﬀerences in test scores, religious identiﬁca-
tion, residential mobility rates, church attendance, and family size were es-
sentially nonexistent.
To adjust for the bias associated with nonresponse, in each year and city
we generated weights for parents and students in the treatment and control
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25. In New York City and Washington, D.C., families in the control group were entered in
a new lottery if they attended follow-up testing in years one and two. In Dayton, control group
families were entered in a new lottery after the ﬁrst year of the program; in year two, they were
oﬀered higher compensation instead. Families that began the study as members of a control
group were dropped from the evaluation if they subsequently won a follow-up lottery. Al-
though this was necessary to preserve the random design of the evaluation, excluding such
families had the eﬀect of reducing the size of the control groups slightly. Although families that
did complete the surveys may be systematically diﬀerent from those that did not, dropping the
randomly selected subset of survey respondents should only decrease the eﬃciency of the es-
timates, not bias the ﬁndings. In D.C. in year three, all control group families and all those that
did not use the initial vouchers oﬀered them were oﬀered a voucher.
26. The one exception here concerns the year-two evaluation in New York City, in which the
treatment group’s response rate was 7 points higher than the control group’s rate.
27. These response rates are similar to those in other randomized ﬁeld trials that follow stu-
dents over time. In his reanalysis of data from the Tennessee class size study, for example,
Krueger (1999), while not providing annual attrition rates, reports that “only half the students
who entered the project in kindergarten were present for all grades K-3” (506).groups. Because those invited to participate in the follow-up studies had
provided information about their family characteristics at baseline, it was
possible to calculate the probability that each participant in the baseline
survey would attend a follow-up session. To do so, we estimated simple logit
regressions that used a set of variables assembled from baseline surveys to
predict the likelihood that each student would attend a follow-up session.
Covariates included mother’s education, employment status, marital status,
and religious aﬃliation; family size; whether the family received welfare
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Table 4A.1 Baseline Characteristics of Respondents and Nonrespondents in Treatment and
Control Groups in Year Two
Treatment Control
Attended Didn’t Attend Attended Didn’t Attend
Year Two Year Two Year Two Year Two
New York City
% African American 42.4 48.3 41.4 47.2
% welfare recipients 53.2 64.5 59.4 62.3
% Catholic 54.7 46.4 53.7 43.2
% protestant 34.3 39.4 35.0 38.8
Average overall test scores 20.1 19.5 22.8 22.6
Average family size 2.6 2.6 2.4 2.9
Average residential mobility 3.7 3.6 3.7 3.7
Average church attendance 3.6 3.3 3.4 3.5
Average mother’s education 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.5
Dayton
% African American 74.0 65.2 71.9 69.3
% welfare recipients 16.7 13.8 16.2 16.7
% Catholic 5.8 14.0 13.4 18.1
% protestant 65.2 58.1 64.6 56.9
Average overall test scores 26.3 26.3 27.2 26.2
Average family size 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.1
Average residential mobility 3.4 3.3 3.3 3.6
Average church attendance 3.4 3.3 3.6 3.7
Average mother’s education 5.6 5.4 5.3 5.6
D.C.
% African American 90.4 92.1 90.9 92.1
% welfare recipients 38.0 34.1 32.1 30.3
% Catholic 15.5 12.6 16.0 13.8
% protestant 72.7 69.9 65.6 70.6
Average overall test scores 26.5 26.4 26.9 26.7
Average family size 3.1 3.1 3.3 3.0
Average residential mobility 3.4 3.5 3.5 3.4
Average church attendance 3.7 3.5 3.7 3.7
Average mother’s education 5.4 5.0 5.3 5.2
Notes: Averages refer to the unweighted mean scores of responses on the parent surveys. Mother’s edu-
cation was scaled slightly diﬀerently in New York City than in Dayton and Washington, D.C., making
intercity comparisons on that item inappropriate.beneﬁts; whether the student was African American; the student’s baseline
math score; whether the student had a learning disability; and whether the
student had experienced disciplinary problems.28
To allow for as much ﬂexibility as possible, separate logit models were es-
timated for treatment and control group members. For illustrative pur-
poses, table 4A.3 reports the results in Washington, D.C. after two years.
Similar results were obtained for other cities and other years.29For the most
part, the family and student characteristics had a similar impact on re-
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Table 4A.2 Baseline Characteristics of African American Respondents and Nonrespondents in
Treatment and Control Groups in Year Two
Treatment Control
Attended Didn’t Attend Attended Didn’t Attend
Year Two Year Two Year Two Year Two
New York City
% welfare recipients 55.3 63.5 65.8 65.8
% Catholic 17.8 18.0 19.5 8.6
% protestant 66.9 67.3 66.8 65.2
Average overall test scores 20.6 19.1 21.2 23.8
Average family size 2.6 2.8 2.5 3.1
Average residential mobility 3.8 3.7 3.7 3.7
Average church attendance 3.4 3.4 3.2 3.3
Average mother’s education 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.6
Dayton
% welfare recipients 15.9 15.0 17.9 20.7
% Catholic 7.6 12.4 8.7 4.7
% protestant 66.1 61.9 76.5 69.8
Average overall test scores 24.3 21.6 23.2 22.0
Average family size 2.7 2.6 2.8 2.9
Average residential mobility 3.4 3.2 3.3 3.6
Average church attendance 3.8 3.7 3.9 4.0
Average mother’s education 6.1 5.8 5.5 5.4
D.C.
% welfare recipients 38.8 31.6 34.7 27.9
% Catholic 13.0 15.1 13.7 16.0
% protestant 76.2 69.4 67.8 67.7
Average overall test scores 26.2 28.3 26.1 28.4
Average family size 3.1 3.0 3.3 2.9
Average residential mobility 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5
Average church attendance 3.7 3.6 3.7 3.8
Average mother’s education 5.4 5.2 5.3 5.4
Notes: See notes to table 4A.1.
28. When baseline information was missing, means were imputed.
29. In each study (in New York City and Washington and in Dayton after Year I) the mod-
els include slightly diﬀerent independent variables.sponse rates for both treatment and control group members. Catholics were
less likely to attend follow-up sessions, as were mothers who were employed
full time or were married. Larger families were more likely to attend follow-
up sessions, as were African American families and families of students
with disciplinary problems. Mother’s education, welfare beneﬁts, and math
scores had a small or insigniﬁcant impact for both treatment and control
group members. The most striking diﬀerence between the two models con-
cerned students with learning disabilities. Although learning disabled stu-
dents in the treatment group were signiﬁcantly more likely to attend follow-
up sessions, such students in the control group were signiﬁcantly less likely
to attend follow-up sessions.
The models generated a set of predicted values that represent the proba-
bility that individuals, given their baseline characteristics, would attend the
follow-up session. The weights are simply the inverse of these predicted val-
ues, that is,






Table 4A.3 Logit Estimates Used to Construct Weights For Treatment and Control
Groups in Washington, D.C. in Year Two
Treatment Group Control Group
Family characteristics
Catholic –0.5* –0.8***
Family size 0.2** 0.2**
Employment status –0.6** –0.1
Married –0.6*** –0.3
Mother’s education 0.0 –0.1**
Welfare –0.3 0.2
African American 0.8*** 0.6***
Student characteristics
Learning disabled 0.7** –1.0**
Disciplinary problems 0.7** 0.7**
Math –0.0 –0.0**
Constant –1.1** –0.6
Pseudo R2 0.07 0.07
Log-likelihood –353.11 –479.83
N 580 866
Notes: The dependent variable is coded 1 if the student attended the year-two follow-up ses-
sion in Washington, D.C., and 0 otherwise. The treatment group consists of all students who
were oﬀered a voucher and participated in the baseline study; the control group consists of all
students who were not oﬀered a voucher.
***Signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level, two-tailed test.
**Signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.
*Signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level.where F( ) is the model’s logistic distribution function. The range of pos-
sible values for W jwas then capped so that the highest weight was four times
the value of the lowest. (This restriction aﬀected only a handful of obser-
vations.) The weights were then rescaled so that the sum of the weights
equaled the sum of the total number of actual observations.30
To generate the weights, we could use only observable characteristics as
recorded in parent surveys. To the extent that there were unmeasured or un-
observable characteristics that encouraged some families, but not others, to
attend follow-up sessions, the weights may not have eliminated the bias as-
sociated with nonresponse. However, in order for response bias to explain
our ﬁndings, three conditions would have to hold. First, respondents would
need to diﬀer from nonrespondents on an unmeasured factor that inﬂu-
enced test performance. Second, the diﬀerence would have to be larger for
one group (treatment or control) than for the other. Third, the diﬀerence
would have to hold for black students but not for students of other ethnic
groups. Although we cannot rule out the possibility that all three conditions
existed in our study, we ﬁnd it unlikely enough to be reasonably conﬁdent
that response bias did not artiﬁcially generate the results we report.
It is possible that change in academic performance over time rather than
baseline characteristics aﬀected the likelihood that diﬀerent subgroups
within the treatment and control groups would attend subsequent testing
sessions. If treatment group families that did not beneﬁt from vouchers
dropped out of the study while control group families that were suﬀering
most in public schools continued to attend follow-up sessions consistently,
then observed impacts may be somewhat inﬂated.
Three questions deserve consideration. Did gains in test scores from base-
line to year one (two) decrease the probability that members of the control
group would attend the year-two (-three) testing session? Did gains increase
the probability that members of the treatment group would attend the year-
two (-three) testing session? And were the diﬀerences in observed impacts on
response rates for the treatment and control groups statistically signiﬁcant?
Table 4A.4 estimates a series of logistic regressions that answer these ques-
tions. The dependent variable identiﬁes whether a student attended the year-
two (-three) follow-up session. The covariates include baseline math and read-
ing test scores, the change in the total test score from baseline to year one (two), 
and the change interacted with treatment status. Separate models were run
for African Americans and members of other ethnic groups. At the bottom
of each column we report the probability that we can reject the following three
null hypotheses: (a) Changes in test scores have a statistically insigniﬁcant ef-
fect on attendance at subsequent testing sessions for the control group; (b) the
eﬀect for the treatment group is statistically insigniﬁcant; and (c) the diﬀer-
ences in observed eﬀects for the two groups are not statistically signiﬁcant.
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.On the whole, the signs of the coeﬃcients are in the expected direction.
Gains in test scores from baseline to years one and two increased the prob-
ability that members of the treatment group attended the subsequent test-
ing session and decreased the probability for members of the control group.
The only models that generated statistically signiﬁcant impacts, however,
were for African Americans in New York after three years and for African
Americans in Dayton after two years. None of the observed impacts for
Hispanics were statistically signiﬁcant in any year or city.
The model that predicts year-three attendance for African Americans in
New York City generated the largest eﬀects. Holding all variables at their
means, the model predicted that 83 percent of the students who attended
the year-two session would attend the year-three session. An increase of 10
NPR points from baseline to year two translated into a 3 percentage point
drop in the probability that a control group member would attend the year-
three testing session and a 1 percentage point increase in the probability
that a member of the treatment group would attend the year-three follow-
up session. Unless weighting adjusted for these diﬀerences, this response
pattern may have marginally contributed to the positive estimate of voucher
impacts on test scores.
In New York City, eighty-two African American students who had at-
tended the year-two testing session failed to show up in year three. The data
presented above suggest that those individuals consisted disproportionately
of control group members whose scores decreased from baseline to year
two and treatment group members whose scores increased, possibly inﬂat-
ing the estimated impact of attending a private school. To further explore
their inﬂuence on estimated impacts, we imputed year-three test scores for
those individuals based on their treatment status, baseline test scores, test
score changes between baseline and year two, and the year-three weights.
Although the observed impacts do drop in magnitude, they remain sta-
tistically significant. When we examined only those African American
students who attended the year-three follow-up session, the estimated im-
pact of switching from a public to a private school at year three was 5.4 NPR
points, with 515 observations and a t-statistic of 3.7. When we looked at the
same population but then imputed year-three test scores for those students
who showed up in year two but not in year three, the size of the estimated
impact of attending a private school dropped to 8.0 NPR points, with a
t-statistic of 3.0.31
Another way of estimating the eﬀects of response rates on outcomes is to
distinguish between earlier and later respondents. Not all participants came
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31. King et al. (2001). The point estimates reported come from weighted regressions: Im-
puted weights for missing observations in year three were constrained to have positive values.
Impacts generated from unweighted regressions using imputed values and observables also are
comparable.to the ﬁrst testing session to which they were invited. Given that we know
the dates when students came in for testing, we can generate exact estimates
of the impact of attending a private school for smaller response rates. In
year one in New York City, for instance, we had an 82 percent response rate.
By successively dropping the portion of students who attended later testing
sessions, we can readily calculate the impacts for lower response rates.
If observed positive impacts derive from imperfect response rates, we
should expect the estimated impact of attending a private school to in-
crease as response rates decline. Presumably, those students who beneﬁt
most from treatment should come earlier to the testing sessions, along with
those students in the control group who were performing most poorly in
public schools. Impacts of attending a private school, then, should be quite
large for lower response rates. The diﬀerences between the two groups,
however, should attenuate (and may actually switch signs) as response rates
increase.
Table 4A.5 reports the estimated impact of attending a private school for
African American students for variable response rates. In each row, the ﬁrst
column represents the estimated impact for the full sample of African
American students who attended testing sessions. Subsequent columns
provide estimates of impacts for lower response rates, based on when stu-
dents came in for testing.
As can be seen in table 4A.5, the New York City estimates remained re-
markably stable for diﬀerent response rates. Had we stopped testing stu-
dents in year one after the ﬁrst 30 percent of the sample showed up, we
would have recovered almost exactly the same ﬁndings that we did after an-
other 52 percent participated: The point estimate for the ﬁrst 30 percent of
students to be tested was 5.7 percentile points, and it was 5.4 for the full
sample. In New York City in years two and three, rather than decreasing as
response rates improved, the estimated impacts actually became larger.
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Table 4A.5 Estimated Impacts of Attending a Private School for African Americans
in New York City for Variable Response Rates (% of Respondents
Attending Follow-Up Sessions)
30 40 56 60 66 70 82
Year one impact 5.7*** 4.4*** 4.2*** 4.8*** 5.0*** 5.3*** 5.4***
Year two impact 3.6 2.7 4.4** 3.2* 4.3** . . .  . . . 
Year three impact 4.2 6.9*** 7.1*** 8.3*** 9.2***a ...  ...  
Notes: Weighted two-stage least squares regressions performed; treatment status used as in-
strument. Diﬀerential response rates calculated by including in the analysis only the relevant
percentage of students to initially attend testing sessions.
aThis is the test score impact for the full sample, at a 67 percent response rate.
***Signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level.
**Signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.
*Signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level, two-tailed test.Moving from a 30 percent response rate to a 66 percent rate, the estimated
test score impact of attending a private school increased by roughly 1 NPR
point and became statistically significant. From these findings, at least,
there is little to suggest that we would have observed significantly diﬀer-
ent impacts had we managed to test a greater number of students in the
treatment and control groups. If anything, these results suggest that we may
have underestimated the true effects of switching from a public to a private
school.
Appendix B
The Eﬀects of the Oﬀer of a Voucher
Tables 4B.1, 4B.2, and 4B.3 report estimated eﬀects of a voucher oﬀer on
student test score performance in each city. These ITT eﬀects are smaller
than actual treatment eﬀects, because many students who were oﬀered
vouchers did not make use of them, and others who were not oﬀered vouch-
ers found alternative ways of ﬁnancing a private education. The percentages
using a voucher in each city are reported in the text of this chapter.
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Table 4B.1 Impact in New York of Being Oﬀered a Voucher on Test Score Performance
Year One Year Two Year Three
Test Score Performance (Percentiles) N (Percentiles) N (Percentiles) N
African Americans
Overall 4.5** 622 3.3** 497 5.5*** 519
(1.2) (1.5) (1.4)
Math 5.7*** 622 3.1* 497 7.0*** 519
(1.5) (1.9) (1.7)
Reading 3.3** 622 3.4** 497 4.0** 519
(1.5) (1.7) (1.7)
All other ethnic groups
Overall –1.3 812 –1.0 699 –2.3 729
(1.3) (1.5) (1.5)
Math –2.4 812 –2.2 699 –1.7 729
(1.7) (2.0) (1.9)
Reading –0.9 812 0.1 699 –2.9* 729
(1.4) (1.6) (1.7)
Notes:Weighted ordinary least squares regressions performed. All models control for baseline test scores
and lottery indicators. Impacts expressed in terms of national percentile rankings. Standard errors re-
ported in parentheses.
***Signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level, two-tailed test.
**Signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.
*Signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level.Table 4B.2 Impact in Washington, D.C. of Being Oﬀered a Voucher on Test Score Performance
Year One Year Two Year Three
Test Score Performance (Percentiles) N (Percentiles) N (Percentiles) N
African Americans
Overall –0.3 891 3.8*** 668 –0.5 656
(1.1) (1.2) (1.2)
Math 2.9** 891 4.3*** 668 0.3 656
(1.3) (1.4) (1.4)
Reading –3.6** 891 3.3** 668 –1.3 656
(1.5) (1.4) (1.5)
All other ethnic groups
Overall 4.7 39 –0.1 42 –0.9 31
(5.6) (5.6) (6.6)
Math 5.5 39 4.1 42 –4.7 31
(7.2) (7.4) (7.7)
Reading 4.0 39 –4.3 42 2.9 31
(8.0) (5.7) (9.1)
Notes: Weighted ordinary least squares regressions performed. Standard errors reported in parentheses.
All models control for baseline test scores; in year one models also control for initial testing session. Im-
pacts expressed in terms of national percentile rankings.
***Signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level.
**Signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.
*Signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level.
Table 4B.3 Impact in Dayton of Being Oﬀered a Voucher on Test 
Score Performance
Year One Year Two
Test Score Performance (Percentiles) N (Percentiles) N
African Americans
Overall 1.9 296 3.5* 273
(2.0) (2.0)
Math 0.2 296 2.8 273
(2.3) (2.3)
Reading 3.5 296 4.1* 273
(2.4) (2.3)
All other ethnic groups
Overall 0.7 108 –0.1 96
(4.1) (4.0)
Math –0.5 108 0.0 96
(4.8) (4.7)
Reading 1.8 108 –0.2 96
(4.5) (4.4)
Notes: Weighted ordinary least squares regressions performed. Standard errors reported in
parentheses. All models control for baseline test scores. Impacts expressed in terms of national
percentile rankings.
***Signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level.
**Signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.
*Signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level.References
Angrist, Joshua D., Guido W. Imbens, and Donald B. Rubin. 1996. Identiﬁcation of
causal eﬀects using instrumental variables. Journal of the American Statistical As-
sociation 91:444–62.
Bridge, R. J., and J. Blackman. 1978. Family choice in education. Vol. 4 of A study of
alternatives in American education. Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation.
Chaplin, Duncan D. 1998. Raising standards: The eﬀects of high school math and
science courses on future earnings. Virginia Journal of Social Policy and Law6 (1):
111–26.
Chubb, John E., and Terry M. Moe. 1990. Politics, markets, and America’s schools.
Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution.
Coerper, Lois H., and Shirley W. Mersereau. 1998. Independent school guide for
Washington, D.C. and surrounding area.11th ed. Chevy Chase, Md.: Independent
School Guides.
Coleman, James S., Thomas Hoﬀer, and Sally Kilgore. 1982. High school achieve-
ment. New York: Basic Books.
Coulson, Andrew J. 1999. Market education: The unknown history. New Brunswick,
N.J.: Social Philosophy and Policy Center and Transaction Publishers.
Elmore, Richard. 1990. Choice as an instrument of public policy: Evidence from ed-
ucation and health care. In Choice and control in American education, Vol. 1: The
theory of choice and control in American education,ed. W. Clune and J. Witte, 285–
318. New York: Falmer.
Evans, William N., and Robert M. Schwab. 1993. Who beneﬁts from private educa-
tion? Evidence from quantile regressions. University of Maryland, Department
of Economics. Working Paper.
Figlio, David, and Joe Stone. 1999. Are private schools really better? In Research in
labor economics,vol. 16, ed. Soloman W. Polachek and John Robst, 115–40. Stam-
ford, Conn.: JAI Press.
Flanagan, Ann, Jennifer Kawata, and Stephanie Williamson. 2000. Improving stu-
dent achievement: What NAEP test scores tell us. Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND
Corporation.
Goldberger, Arthur S., and Glen G. Cain. 1982. The causal analysis of cognitive out-
comes in the Coleman, Hoﬀer, and Kilgore report. Sociology of Education 55
(April-July): 103–22.
Greene, Jay P., William G. Howell, and Paul E. Peterson. 1998. Lessons from the
Cleveland scholarship program. In Learning from school choice, ed. Paul E. Pe-
terson and Bryan C. Hassel, 357–92, Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution.
Greene, Jay P., Paul E. Peterson, and Jiangtao Du. 1998. School choice in Milwau-
kee: A randomized experiment. In Learning from school choice, ed. Paul E. Peter-
son and Bryan C. Hassel, 335–56. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution.
Hill, Jennifer, Donald B. Rubin, and Neal Thomas. 1998. The design of the New
York  school choice scholarship program evaluation. Paper presented at the
American Political Science Association annual meeting. 31 August, Boston,
Massachusetts.
Hoﬀer, Thomas, Andrew Greeley, and James Coleman. 1985. Achievement growth
in public and Catholic schools. Sociology of Education 58 (April): 74–97.
Howell, William G., and Paul E. Peterson. 2000. School choice in Dayton, Ohio: An
evaluation after one year. Harvard University, Program on Education Policy and
Governance. Occasional paper, February.
Howell, William G., Paul E. Peterson, Patrick J. Wolf, and David Campbell. 2002.
142 Paul E. Peterson, William G. Howell, Patrick J. Wolf, and David E. CampbellThe education gap: Vouchers and urban schools. Washington, D.C.: Brookings In-
stitution.
Jencks, Christopher, and Meridith Phillips, ed. 1999. The black-white test score gap.
Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution.
King, Gary, James Honaker, Anne Joseph, and Kenneth Scheve. 2001. Analyzing
incomplete political science data: An alternative algorithm for multiple imputa-
tion. American Political Science Review 95 (1): 46–69.
Krueger, Alan. 1999. Experimental estimates of education production functions.
Quarterly Journal of Economics 114:497–533.
Krueger, Alan, and Diane Whitmore. 2000. Would smaller classes help close the
black-white achievement gap? Paper presented at conference entitled Closing the
Gap: Promising Strategies for Reducing the Achievement Gap. February, Wash-
ington, D.C.
Metcalfe, Kim K., William J. Boone, Frances K. Stage, Todd L. Chilton, Patty
Muller, and Polly Tait. 1998. A comparative evaluation of the Cleveland scholar-
ship and tutoring grant program: Year one: 1996–97. Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana
University School of Education, Smith Research Center.
Murname, Richard, John B. Willet, Yves Duhaldeborde, and John H. Tyler. 2000.
How important are the cognitive skills of teenagers in predicting subsequent
earnings? Journal of Policy Analysis and Management 19 (4): 547–68.
Myers, David, Paul E. Peterson, Daniel Mayer, Julia Chou, and William P. Howell.
2000. School choice in New York City after two years: An evaluation of the school
choice scholarships program. Harvard University, Program on Education Policy
and Governance. Occasional paper, September.
Neal, Derek. 1997. The eﬀects of Catholic secondary schooling on educational
achievement. Journal of Labor Economics 15 (1): 98–123.
Peterson, Paul E. 1998. School choice: A report card. In Learning from school choice,
ed. Paul E. Peterson and Bryan C. Hassel, 3–32. Washington, D.C.: Brookings In-
stitution.
Peterson, Paul E., Jay P. Greene, William G. Howell, and William McCready. 1998.
Initial ﬁndings from an evaluation of school choice programs in Dayton, Ohio
and Washington, D.C. Harvard University, Program on Education Policy and
Governance. Occasional paper, October.
Peterson, Paul E., and Bryan C. Hassel, ed. 1998. Learning from school choice.Wash-
ington, D.C.: Brookings Institution.
Peterson, Paul E., David E. Myers, Josh Haimson, and William G. Howell. 1997.
Initial ﬁndings from the evaluation of the New York school choice scholarships
program. Harvard University, Program on Education Policy and Governance.
Occasional paper, November.
Peterson, Paul E., David E. Myers, and William G. Howell. 1998. An evaluation of
the New York City school choice scholarships program: The ﬁrst year. Harvard
University, Program on Education Policy and Governance. Occasional Paper,
October.
Peterson, Paul E., David E. Myers, William G. Howell, and Daniel P. Mayer. 1999.
The eﬀects of school choice in New York City. Chap. 12 in Earning and learning:
How schools matter,ed. Susan B. Mayer and Paul E. Peterson. Washington, D.C.:
Brookings Institution.
Rouse, Cecilia. 1997. Private school vouchers and student achievement: An evalua-
tion of the Milwaukee parental choice program. Princeton University, Depart-
ment of Economics. Working Paper.
Schneider, Mark, Paul Teske, Melissa Marschall, and Christine Roch. 1998.
Tiebout, school choice, allocative and productive eﬃciency. Paper presented at
School Vouchers 143the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association. 3–6 Septem-
ber, Boston, Mass.
U.S. Department of Education, Oﬃce of Educational Research and Improvement,
National Center for Education Statistics. 2000. Common core of data, school years
1993–94 through 1997–98. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Education.
West, Martin R., Paul E. Peterson, and David E. Campbell. 2001. School choice in
Dayton, Ohio after two years. Harvard University, Program on Education Policy
and Governance. Occasional paper, August.
Wilms, Douglas J. 1985. Catholic school eﬀects on academic achievement: New ev-
idence from high school and beyond follow-up study. Sociology of Education 58:
98–114.
Witte, John F. 1996. School choice and student performance. In Holding schools ac-
countable: Performance-based reform in education, ed. Helen F. Ladd, 149–76.
Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution.
———. 1997. Achievement eﬀects of the Milwaukee voucher program. Paper pre-
sented at the annual meeting of the American Economics Association. January,
New Orleans, La.
Wolf, Patrick J., William G. Howell, and Paul E. Peterson. 2000. School choice in
Washington, D.C.: An evaluation after one year. Harvard University, Program on
Education Policy and Governance. Occasional paper, February.
Wolf, Patrick J., Paul E. Peterson, and Martin R. West. 2001. Results of a school
voucher experiment: The case of Washington, D.C. after two years. Harvard Uni-
versity, Program on Education Policy and Governance. Occasional paper, Au-
gust.
144 Paul E. Peterson, William G. Howell, Patrick J. Wolf, and David E. Campbell